Compositionality of Security Protocols: A Research Agenda  by Cremers, Cas
Compositionality of Security Protocols:
A Research Agenda
Cas Cremers1
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Abstract
The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched
during the last 25 years. Several formalisms and (semi-)automatic tools for the veriﬁcation of
security protocols have been developed. However, their applicability is limited to relatively small
protocols that run in isolation. Many of the protocols that are in use today cannot be veriﬁed using
these methods. One of the main reasons for this is that these protocols are composed of several
sub-protocols. Such a composition of protocols is not addressed in the majority of formalisms.
In this paper we identify a number of issues that are relevant to applying formal methods to the
problem of security protocol composition. Additionally, we describe what research needs to be
done to meet this challenge.
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1 Introduction
Within the areas of Internet, e-commerce and smart card applications, the
use of cryptographic primitives is by now standard practice. In the last few
decades much research has covered the mathematical issues involved in such
cryptographic primitives, and many of these are by now well understood.
However, using such well-understood cryptographic primitives to implement
a protocol does not guarantee that the protocol itself satisﬁes a security re-
quirement (See e.g. [10]). This observation has guided a branch of research
on security protocols where the cryptographic primitives are assumed to be
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perfect, and a black-box view of cryptography is used (cf. [8]). Using formal
models, it is possible to prove that a security protocol is correct (see [16,6])
under some assumptions. Furthermore, there are various tools that can ﬁnd
attacks on security protocols such as [4,11,13].
Although much advances have been made, the protocols that have been
investigated are still modest in size. The available proof methods, as well as
the tools, do not scale well. In the same vein, the formal models assume what
we call a closed world. This means that the agents in the system do not exhibit
any other behaviour than is speciﬁed in the protocol.
This closed world assumption does not hold for most applications. For ex-
ample, agents on the Internet are usually capable of many types of behaviour,
and use multiple protocols concurrently.
But even if the closed world assumption does not hold, folklore and com-
mon sense indicate that as long as parallel protocols share no common data,
no harm is done. Many designs rely on this hypothesis and use diﬀerent keys
for diﬀerent protocols.
On the other hand, in many contexts it is desirable to have keys that are
shared among protocols. When designing protocols for smart card applica-
tions, resources such as memory and bandwidth are limited and thus it makes
sense to re-use key material. Even when designing a complex system where
such resources are suﬃciently available, it can be very expensive to introduce
a key infrastructure for each sub-protocol.
We consider veriﬁcation of a single protocol under the closed world assump-
tion to be often unrealistic, as well as undesirable for the design of complex
systems involving security protocols. Therefore, we set out to enlarge this
closed world, and improve the scalability of the existing formal methods. Fur-
thermore, we suggest a new level of abstraction for the composition of security
protocols. We identify a number of open issues, to be addressed by future work
on security protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we
investigate the closed world assumption and give some examples to indicate
the problem areas. Then, in Section 3, we discuss how to model a larger closed
world, and indicate requirements for the semantics of such a world. We sketch
a new level of abstraction speciﬁcally tailored for the problem in Section 4.
Some related work is discussed in Section 5, and we close oﬀ in Section 6 with
concluding remarks and a number of open research questions.
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2 Composition of Security Protocols
As stated in the introduction, there exist several formal methods to establish
that a security protocol achieves some security goals. One of the assumptions
made by these methods is the closed world assumption, i.e. that the agents
involved exhibit no other behaviour than that which is described by the pro-
tocol. This assumption, combined with an explicit intruder model (such as
Dolev-Yao, see [8]), enables us to describe all possible states of the system
which is the composition of the agents and the intruder. The fact that every
possible behaviour of this system is modeled, allows some properties of the
system to be proven.
If we execute several (provably correct) protocols in the same environment,
it can be the case that the goals are not achieved anymore. An intruder can use
parts of a protocol to generate messages that he could not construct otherwise.
When multiple protocols are executed concurrently, the number of messages
that the intruder can forge increases exponentially. This can result in new
ways of attacking a protocol. An example of such an attack on an early
version of SSL is described in [1]. Another attack on a composed protocol can
be found in [15].
It is possible to verify such protocol collections by modeling them as a
single larger protocol, but the resulting protocol is typically very large, and
therefore outside the scope of current methods.
The upshot of this is, that there are small protocols known that provably
achieve security goals such as secrecy or authentication, under some assump-
tions such as the closed world assumption. In isolation these protocols are not
very useful. In real world applications they will be used either concurrently or
appended to other protocols, thereby invalidating the closed world assumption
of the proof. Consequently, the resulting system will not necessarily meet the
security goals.
The current practice is that large or composed protocols are not formally
veriﬁed. The veriﬁcation tools can verify small protocols, but there are no
guidelines as how to combine them into larger protocols without introducing
new attacks.
We would like to remedy this situation, and make formal methods appli-
cable to real life systems. To facilitate this, and make the formal methods
usable for larger systems, a number of challenges need to be addressed. In the
next two sections we sketch two possible approaches to the problem.
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3 Improving the scalability
A major drawback of the formal approaches to security protocol analysis is
their lack of scalability. We ﬁnd that the size of security protocols that can be
analysed, is still fairly small when compared to the protocols that are used in
e.g. Internet protocols such as SSL. Many of the protocols that are in use today
consist of a collection of sub-protocols, composed in parallel. In general such
a larger, composed protocol cannot be veriﬁed using current formal methods.
We believe that many of the current methods do not scale well for such
protocols, due to three main reasons.
(i) State space explosion. If a protocol is extended with a number of mes-
sages, the state space of the system grows exponentially. Note that this
problem is not speciﬁc to security protocol analysis.
(ii) Lack of support in the formal models to capture sub-protocol composi-
tion.
(iii) Lack of support in the formal models to express security goals for sub-
protocols.
Some attempts have already been made to address these problems. The
state space explosion problem is not speciﬁc to security protocols, and occurs
in many models of concurrent processes. It can sometimes be remedied us-
ing symbolic representation, or by providing invariants or other state space
restrictions for speciﬁc instances of the model, but these techniques typically
require (creative) user input. However, dealing with this is not within the
scope of this article and we refer the reader to e.g. [2].
The second problem, the lack of support of (sub)protocol composition, has
been addressed within the Strand Spaces framework from [16]. Within the
original Strand Spaces framework it is not possible to model parallel protocols.
This has lead to a minor modiﬁcation of the Strand Spaces model, which is
called the Mixed Strand Spaces model (see [15]). In this model, notions of
primary and secondary strands are introduced, which allows a protocol to be
analysed in the presence of other protocols. However, in this mixed model the
third problem of specifying subgoals is left to the user modeling the system.
Great care has to be taken when composing two sub-protocols, as the resulting
set of goals might not be consistent.
A more recent formal model which can handle the parallel composition
of protocols and goals, is the Operational Semantics of Security Protocols
as deﬁned in [6]. In this model, the notion of a protocol role is considered
the basic unit of modeling. The model of a simple protocol consists of a
collection of roles, and within these semantics the parallel composition of
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protocols is captured by simply adding more roles to the system. Security
goals are modeled as events in the protocol, representing local claims, and can
be composed without any problem.
Much work remains to be done. We identify a number of hurdles that still
need to be taken.
3.1 Determination of bound on runs
In general, tool based veriﬁcation of security protocols assumes a bound of
the number of runs, or protocol role instances, that are involved in an attack.
Such a bound is used to restrict the state space of the problem and make
automated veriﬁcation feasible. Sometimes this bound is explicitly determined
using hand proofs as in [10], but in most cases a low bound is simply assumed.
This implies that most tools can prove that there is attack, but they cannot
prove that a protocol is secure beyond the chosen bound. The reason for this
is that there are no proofs known that yield a usable theoretical bound for
any protocol.
Until now, veriﬁcation using tools was based on some rule of thumb (e.g. two
arbitrary instances of each role) or experience (attacks in literature involve
three or four runs at most). When we are verifying composed protocols, such
a bound becomes relevant again, as even having two instances of each role
might lead to a state space that is far too large to explore. If possible, we are
looking for an automatic procedure that, given a speciﬁc protocol and security
goals, can determine an upper bound on the runs involved in an attack.
3.2 Support for protocol composition
The majority of security protocol models, do not support composed protocol
analysis. A ﬁrst step towards veriﬁcation of these protocols is to adapt the
semantics of the formal models. It might be the case that some models cannot
easily be adapted for such a task, so research is required.
The adaption of the semantics of the models is also required for tooling.
If a certain model does not support protocol composition, then neither will
the tools based on the model. This is the case with the e.g. the Casper/FDR
toolset (see [11]). The Athena tool (see [13]) supports parallel composition of
protocols, but requires an expert user to provide suitable input. The Scyther
tool (see [4]) supports composition in an intuitive way, by simply concatenating
the protocol descriptions.
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3.3 Support for security requirements composition
There are two main reasons why the composition of security requirements is
non-trivial.
The ﬁrst reason is that security properties were usually designed with just
simple protocols in mind. Many security properties are deﬁned as two-party
properties, e.g. Alice authenticates Bob, Alice shares a key with Bob. Such
properties can introduce ambiguities in a composed protocol context.
As an example, consider two parallel protocols P1 and P2 that both use
the same base authentication protocol. Suppose Alice starts an instance of
protocol P1. Because the base protocols are identical, she ends up talking
to a responder instance of Bob. She can prove she is talking to Bob, but
she cannot be sure which protocol he is using. Suppose protocol P1 uses the
random values from the base protocol to create a session key, whereas P2 uses
these to create a publicly known session identiﬁer. Alice creates a session key
from the value, but Bob, who is executing protocol P2, actually makes the
random values public. Thus, the diﬀerent semantics for the random values
can cause serious security problems. Note that in both cases Alice and Bob
agree over the random values that they used.
A strong authentication property that can be safely composed is synchro-
nisation as deﬁned in [7]. However, other properties need to be revisited as
well in the light of requirement composition.
A second reason why such a composition is non-trivial, is because many
formalisms consider the security requirement to be a seperate entity from the
protocol speciﬁcation, as in e.g. the strand spaces model. On one hand we
have a protocol speciﬁcation, and on the other hand there are seperate logical
formulas for the requirements. When we compose two protocols, we also need
to compose these logical formulas. Whether such a composition yields a valid
security requirement is an open question.
An alternative approach is taken in our Operational Semantics for Security
Protocols, where security property claims are modeled as events in the proto-
col. Thus, the requirements are integrated into the protocol speciﬁcation. If
two protocols are composed, the requirements are also composed. The secu-
rity requirements have been modeled with the possibility of parallel protocols
in mind.
3.4 Compositionality of proofs
Although the Mixed Strand Spaces and the Operational Semantics mentioned
both look promising, their usefulness is limited by the fact that in general
protocol proofs are not compositional. Thus, for the composition of two prov-
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ably correct protocols, a new proof has to be constructed. In some cases we
can avoid this: A result from the Mixed Strand Spaces model states that if
two protocols are suﬃciently dissimilar (see [9]), the correctness of the security
goal of one protocol is independent of the presence of the other protocol. Such
results are useful for the design of protocols. However, we need more of these
types of results in order to reason about the composition of protocols.
3.5 Speciﬁcations of the context of security protocols
When a security protocol is formally speciﬁed, it is common to specify its re-
quirements when it runs in isolation. This is connected to the way veriﬁcation
proceeds. However, when designing a protocol we can already indicate under
which assumptions it will remain correct when composed with other protocols.
As an example, consider a protocol intended to generate and distribute a
secret session key, which will be used to authenticate a sequence of messages,
and keep their contents secret. After the key is known to the involved agents,
the formal protocol typically ends. The protocol implicitly assumes that the
session key is then used in a correct way, e.g. such that it remains secret.
This is not expressed in the key exchange protocol, which has only the goal of
establishing the key. However, such a protocol only makes sense if we actually
use the session key in some other protocol, and it must therefore always be
kept secret.
Most of the present protocols are not meant to be executed in isolation.
Furthermore, many design decisions are made because these protocols are
meant to be composed with other protocols. Thus, it is important to make
these assumptions on the environment explicit.
However, current protocol speciﬁcation formalisms are not suited to ex-
press this. We need ways of expressing the exact requirements of a protocol.
For the example, we need to enforce some rules on how the session key is to be
used. Furthermore, the protocol might make assumptions about an existing
public/private key infrastructure, and introduce some proof obligations for
the resulting composed system. One important research question would be to
ﬁnd concise ways of expressing these requirements.
Once such requirements for the context of protocols can be speciﬁed, we can
start to consider these small protocols as building blocks for larger composed
protocols. If we ﬁx a set of small protocols to serve as building blocks, we can
consider them as primitives for another level of abstraction. We explore this
option in the next section.
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4 Yet another level of abstraction
The standard Dolev-Yao model of black-box security protocols depends on
cryptographic primitives such as encryption and signing. One reason for the
research into black-box security protocols is that even if perfect cryptographic
primitives exist, a protocol can still be attacked, as is shown by the usual
example of the Needham-Schroeder protocol in [10].
The security protocol analysis works at a diﬀerent level of abstraction
than the cryptographic primitives. At the protocol level, we have security
goals such as secrecy and authentication, that diﬀer from their counterparts
on the cryptographic level. Furthermore, new concepts are introduced such
as injectivity.
This layer of abstraction has enabled formal analysis and automatic ver-
iﬁcation of security protocols. However, it seems that parallel protocol com-
position is stretching the limits of the protocol model, and one way out would
be another level of abstraction.
We propose to introduce a new layer of abstraction, tailored speciﬁcally for
the composition of security protocols. Such an abstraction will require security
goals to be formulated at a protocol composition level. Corresponding to
this, a new set of primitives, consisting of e.g. security protocols and message
encapsulation, will have to be formulated.
Note that such an abstraction layer will not have the intention to assist the
veriﬁcation of existing protocols, rather it will be used for construction and
design of new protocols. Therefore, the fundamental issue will be choosing an
appropriate set of primitives and related concepts.
As an example, consider an authentication protocol. Such a protocol
achieves e.g. agreement or synchronisation (as deﬁned in [12] and [7]). In
practice, and in a protocol composition setting, we would like to extend such
an authentication protocol with another message exchange, such that the new
messages are also authenticated. We believe that such a message extension
is an integral part of the authentication protocol. Therefore, a composition
primitive for authentication would function as an encapsulation for a sequence
of message exchanges. Given a message exchange, we would apply such an
authentication primitive, and the resulting protocol would satisfy synchroni-
sation.
For the protocols in the standard libraries such as the Security Protocols
Open Repository in [14] we have found Message Sequence Charts suﬃciently
expressive. However, for compositional issues such as a protocol that allows an
agent to choose between sub-protocols, we expect that a graphical formalism
such as e.g. High Level Message Sequence Charts will be required.
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4.1 Develop concepts and primitives
At the protocol composition layer, we expect security goals such as secrecy to
be straightforward extensions of their protocol counterparts. For goals such
as authentication, privacy, and non-repudiation, we expect that signiﬁcant
modiﬁcations will have to be made to the concepts, in order to apply to
protocol composition.
Fig. 1. A composition of two protocols
Consider the composition of the two protocols in ﬁgure 4.1. The message
m2 is claimed to be secret in protocol 1. However, it also occurs in protocol 2.
A goal such as secrecy is global to composition of protocols, and possibly has
implications for every message sent in the system. Thus, we would expect a
secrecy primitive not to consist of a sub-protocol, but as a global requirement,
or rather as a transformation rule on all messages.
Other goals such as session authentication can be constructed as protocols,
which can encapsulate other messages or protocols. As indicated by the grey
area in in protocol 2 in the same ﬁgure, we might indicate exactly which parts
of the protocol are to be authenticated. Thus, if we encapsulate the sending
of some data within the session authentication protocol, the data itself will be
authenticated as well. An implementation of such a primitive could involve
setting up a session key, and encrypting the data (along with a sequence
number) with this session key.
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4.2 Analysis of primitives
Once appropriate primitives are chosen, we need to analyse their compositional
properties. It is desirable to have primitives with compositional properties
that are as simple as possible. There is a trade-oﬀ between the complexity
of compositional properties and eﬃciency/size. For example, when no data
is shared between primitives, compositionality is easier than with shared key
infrastructures.
When designing primitives, we expect dependencies to arise. For exam-
ple, in the Dolev-Yao model, authentication requires the secrecy of some data
items. Thus, a dependency is established between such the authentication
concept and the secrecy concept, with respect to a speciﬁc intruder model.
Investigating these dependencies will help in proving properties of the primi-
tives and also help to make to descriptions more concise.
5 Related work
There exist other attempts at handling security protocol composition. We
brieﬂy discuss some attempts.
Although the majority of security protocol formalisms do not cope with
protocol composition, there has been much work on improving the scalability
of the current methods to larger protocols. We feel that this helps to pave
the way for the veriﬁcation of composed protocols. We mention two such
methods. First, many advances have been made in the Strand Spaces model
from [16], resulting in the eﬃcient Athena tool in [13]. Second, a tool that is
already able to deal with parallel protocols is the Scyther tool we developed.
This tool is based on the operational semantics of security protocols from [6]
and uses partial order reduction techniques as explained in [5].
A recent development is the concept of Universal Composability as pro-
posed by Canetti in [3]. This approach has its roots in secure multi-party
computation, and is tailored towards constructing (sub)protocols that achieve
their goals, irrespective of the environment they are placed in. This leads
to some stringent requirements on the protocols, but also on the environ-
ment. The resulting protocols diﬀer in two important ways from the type of
primitives we propose. First, they allow for a speciﬁc compositional property
(universal composability) whereas we allow for more types of primitives, which
possibly share information or encapsulate other protocols. Second, within the
Universal Composability framework, there is a ﬁxed intruder model, whereas
we propose to formulate the concepts, goals and abstract primitives regardless
of the intruder model.
Another approach has been to modify the Strand Spaces model, making it
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suitable for handling protocol composition, in [15]. This Mixed Strand Spaces
model has been used to derive theoretical results. Initial results showed how
attacks on protocol composition were possible. Later results include circum-
stances under which protocols can be safely combined in [9], where suggestions
for ﬁxing the protocols are also given. This approach helps towards extending
current methods, but it lacks a more appropriate level of abstraction.
6 Closing comments
The last few decades of security protocol research have resulted in impressive
progress, in both the formal veriﬁcation of fairly small protocols as well as
tool support. The next step is to tackle larger protocols, composed of several
sub-protocols.
To do any kind of formal analysis, some assumptions on the model are
needed, which will always imply some form of closed world assumption. How-
ever, given the advances in the ﬁeld, it should be possible to reason about a
larger closed world.
Here we have presented our ideas on the research that is needed, for formal
methods to be applicable to the composition of security protocols. We have
also sketched initial ideas for another abstraction layer. Furthermore, we have
discussed speciﬁc research topics that can serve as a starting point for future
research.
Work that we have already done ourselves includes the development of an
Operational Semantics of Security Protocols that supports protocol composi-
tion. Based on these semantics we have developed a veriﬁcation tool, Scyther,
that can ﬁnd attacks on composed protocols.
However, much work still needs to be done. We summarise the main open
research issues:
(i) Adapt existing semantics and tools to support protocol composition.
(ii) Determination of minimal upper bound on runs involved in an attack,
given a protocol.
(iii) Investigate compositionality of proofs.
(iv) Extend speciﬁcations of security protocols, to include exact usage con-
ditions, under which they are correct when e.g. composed with other
protocols.
(v) Develop another abstraction layer for security protocol composition, and
abstract away from protocol details.
(vi) Develop concepts such as security goals and primitives for this abstraction
level.
C. Cremers / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 99–110 109
(vii) Determine relations between these concepts, and the intruder model.
It is our intention to work on these research questions, and we would like
to invite others to investigate them as well.
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